Reza Dibadj is a Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco. He began his academic career as an Assistant Professor at the University of Miami.
His research focuses primarily on corporate and securities law. He also studies the regulation of business through the lenses of antitrust and administrative law. His writing focuses on two themes. The first involves the application of new tools, such as network theory, to legal analysis. The second is an exploration of different institutional choices the law has made. For instance, corporate and securities law often try to achieve similar goals, but through very different means; similarly for antitrust and regulation. For their part, corporate and administrative law each present distinct approaches to problems of governance and delegation. Which methods are preferable, and under what circumstances? These two themes converge in an attempt to propose new, welfare-enhancing, institutional arrangements for the relationship between government and business.
Publications vary in method and scope: some cover broad themes, while others are narrowly focused; some are theoretical, others empirical. Much of the work is interdisciplinary, drawing primarily from law and economics. He has published one book and over thirty-five law review articles, book reviews and book chapters. Current projects include exploring the duty of disclosure in Delaware corporate law; secondary liability in securities law in the wake of recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent; and the possibility of developing a new framework, based on manipulation rather than common law fraud, in securities fraud cases.
Dibadj is a graduate of Harvard Law School, Harvard Business School, and Harvard College.